The modularity thesis: its implications for interpretations of priming effects by Davis, Christopher W.
Taula (UIB) núm. 15,1992 
The modularity thesis: its implications for 
interpretations of priming effects 
Christopher W. Davis 
Universidad Complutense de Madrid 
Abstract 
The aim of thispaper was to show that Fodor's modulariv thesisprovides aframework 
for interpreting data rhought to be relevant to the structure of the languageprocessor. In setting 
out a background to this, the basic research enterprise of isolating processor properties was 
considered, with an emphasis on the logic underlying the use ofaparticular experimental technique 
(repetitionpriming) as a way of determiiting yrocessing architecture within the language module. 
This enterprise was considered with respect to Fodor's account of mental architecture; the 
suggestion being mude is that in its traditional form, the priming technique will give ambiguous 
results. Iiz order to overcome this, a inodz3cation to the priming technique was investigated. 
Resumen 
El objetivo de este artículo es mostrar que la tesis de la modularidad de Fodor 
proporciona un marco de trabajo desde el que se puede interpretar datos relevantes sobre la 
estructura del procesador del lenguaje. Para ello, se propone aislar propiedades de dicho 
procesador, utilizando la lógica subyacente a la técnica experimental del ((priming de repeticiórt» 
como medio para determinar la arquitectura de procesamiento dentro del módulo del lenguaje. 
Esta linea de investigacion se examina coizsiderando la propuesta de Fodor sobre la arquitectura 
mental. Finalmente, se sugiere que la técnica de «priming» en la forma que se ha utilizado 
tradicionalmenteproporcioiza resultados ambiguos, y se propone una modz3cación de la misma. 
The pnmary interest of this paper concerns the possible implications of Fodor's 
modularity thesis forexpenmental inquiry inpsycholinguistics. Specifically, the assumptions 
implicit in the use of a particular experimental task thought to index lexical structure will 
be examined in order to show how theories of mental architecture and the interpretation of 
data interact. In order to see how these two are linked it is necessary to provide some 
background into research conceming visual word recognition. 
The priming paradigm has become one of the most extensively used tech- 
niques in the study of visual word recognition. The termprirning has had broad appli- 
cation in the word recognition literature. It seems to have been used to describe virtually 
any situation where a facilitation in performance for one stimulus occurs, given an 
encounter with another. The idea, simply put, is that an initial stimulus input, theprime, 
benefits the processing of a subsequent input, the target. Pnming effects have been 
shown to occur over a range of prime-target relationships: in repetition priming, the 
prime and target stimuli are the same (Scarborough, Cortese and Scarborough, 1977); 
in semantic and associative pnming, there is either a meaning-based or an experiential 
link between the prime and target (Meyer and Schvaneveldt, 197 1); and in form priming, 
the prime and target share properties of form (Hillinger, 1980). 
Effects of this lund have been used to make inferences about the properties of 
the information processing systems underlying word recognition performance. The 
particular interest of this paper centers on repetition pnming and the variables influencing 
its occurrence and magnitude in expenments which typically use the lexical decision task. 
In these experirnents, the dorninant dependent variable is response latency, a measure 
which is assumed to reflect the duration of processes involved in word recognition. 
When items are repeated in a lexical decision expenment, with first encounters 
acting as pnmes for second encounter targets, response latencies for target words in general 
decrease markedly. This holds true even when a considerable time (say, 20 minutes os 
more) elapses between successive presentations (Forbach, Stanners, and Hochhaus, 1974; 
Kirsner and Smith, 1974; Scarborough, Cortese and Scarborough, 1977). 
This finding, henceforth referred to as the repetition priming effect, has been 
interpreted by many investigators in tesms of a reduction in the processing time required 
for the recognition of the target word. The mechanism proposed to account for this 
reduction varies with the theoretical position adopted to explain word recognition, in 
general. For example, Morton (1979) interprets the finding within his system of 
logogens, the evidence-gathenng detectors whose activation is the basis of word 
recognition in this theoretical framework. Where the same logogen can be activated by 
both prime and target, the raised activation leve1 which is a product of the prime 
presentation is said to persist, to pesmit a reduction in the evidence, and hence time, 
required for the target to raise activation above threshold. 
Regardless of any particular theoretical stance, the assumption that repetition 
priming reflects some change in the processes underlying word recognition has 
important consequences. In particular, it leads the investigator to interpret variables 
which modulate the size of the repetition priming effect as yielding information about 
lexical organization. In the end, the interest is not in repetition pnming, per se, but in its 
use as a means to probe the lexical component of the language processor. 
To illustrate the way the arguments about lexical structure are constructed on 
the basis of facts about repetition priming, consider Morton's (1979, 1980) use of his 
finding that the effect is eliminated when pnmes and targets are presented in different 
modalities. Because Morton treats repetition pnming as a purely lexical effect, he is 
obliged to postulate that each word has a separate representation (logogen) for each 
input modality. A modality dissociation in the repetition priming effect translates to a 
modality dissociation in lexical architecture: auditory presentation of a word leads to 
residual activation in its phonological logogen, but not in its orthographic logogen. 
Monsell (1987) has adopted a similar strategy for carving up the language 
processor. Treating repetition priming as the product of temporary modifications to the 
processes of lexical access, he argues from the results of arange of experiments that the 
orthographic lexicon should itself be divided; writing a word, it seems, does not 
necessarily activate the orthographic lexicon used in reading. The priming technique has 
also been used as a research tool to study the basis of bilingual lexical representation, 
with the failure of priming from one language to another being regarded as evidence for 
separate, non-connectedlexicons. The unstated ideain al1 these studies has been that this 
task gives a theoi-yfi-ee look at mental structure. In order to understand why this might 
not be the case, we need to consider why the modularity thesis cautions against making 
such inferences. 
Fodor's modularity thesis is a proposal about mental organization and the 
division of mental labor between processing domains. The primary claim is that there 
is a mental architecture in which the information exchange between processors is 
limited. This restriction thereby sets a boundary on those confirmation relations needed 
to determine perceptual belief. Fodor (1983) has proposed that the fixation of any 
perceptual belief involves the operation of three functionally distinct systems. At the 
interface between the organism and the environment, transducers convert sensory 
stimulation into some form of low-leve1 neural code. Computations are then performed 
on these transducer outputs by input systems, which yield hypotheses about the nature 
of the dista1 object underlying the proximal stimulus configurations at the transducer. 
Finally, central systems arrive at a belief about the externa1 object by conecting the 
outputs of an input system in the light of background knowledge and of the output of 
other input systems. 
For Fodor, the language faculty is a strong candidate for an input system. In 
common with al1 input systems, alanguage processor is modularinpossessing anumber 
of properties. For example, it is domain specific (its processes operate only on inputs of 
a specified kind, and its outputs are similarly limited); its operation is mandatory (given 
an appropriate input, its processes automatically run their course); and its working 
products are unlikely to be accesible to central systems, and hence to consciousness 
(see Fodor, 1983, pp. 47-101). 
The idea of a modular language processor is reflected in theones of lexical 
access which regard the lexicon as a data-base in the service of sentence processing 
devices. What follows naturally from this is that those vocabulary features which are 
crucially involved in language processing are recorded in the database (e.g., spelling, 
pronunciation, syntactic class, and so on), while other incidental facts are not. To put it 
succinctly, the lexicon is placed within an input module (see Fodor, 1983; Forster, 1979; 
Seidenberg, 1985). 
Now ifthe modular view is taken senously, a problem now arises in the 
interpretation of priming effects. For these effects could be generated in a number of 
ways and at markedly different locations in the perceptual-cognitive apparatus. At lower 
levels storage may be simply be a change in state in the operating characteristics of a 
transducer. At the highest level, the fact that a priming event has occurred may be stored 
as a record of a perceptual belief, fully elaborated. This seems to be an inevitable 
problem in the study of mental processes, for «overt, observable behavior is an 
interaction effect par excellence» (Fodor, 1983, p. 1). That is, a researcher's dilemma 
is that observed behavior is the joint product of contributing sub-systems which may 
differ from each other in important ways. The individuation of the separate contributions 
of different sub-systems is likely to be difficult. In particular, data which are presumed 
to yield information about the structure of an input module (e.g., data about repetition 
priming effects with word materials) are likely to be contaminated by the influence of 
systems outside this module (e.g., central memory effects). 
The task of eliminating competing explanations of putatively lexical phenomena 
is not a newly arising one. Coltheart (1978) makes a cautionary point with respect to the 
suitability of methods for examining lexical processing: 
If we wish to discover how lexical access is achieved, it seems 
advisable to use experimental tasks which cannot be performed in the 
absence of lexical access, but require little else. (p. 170) 
The problem is, if anything, exacerbated by the fact that most available 
language tasks and performance measures involve the operations of the highest levels 
of the cognitive apparatus (Forster, 1985, p. 9). If the properties of a particular 
processing system are to be investigated, experimental ingenuity is called for to ensure 
that variations in the performance measure reflect only processes within that system, 
with the contribution from other processors minimized. 
In sum, what cannot be disregarded is the possibility that although a task 
includes language module processes, it may also include something more. Since 
behavior in a language taskis deterrnined jointly by the products of the language module 
and higher inferential systems, «lexical decision times will reflect lexical access times 
only to the extent that irrelevant influences have been eliminated» (Forster, 1985, p. 10). 
Forster's observation is not of course particular to lexical decision latencies, or even to 
latencies more generally, though it has real force in the case of repetition priming. If an 
initial encounter with a word is to have an effect at a later stage, it must be stored in 
memory. The critica1 question is which memory or system: a specialized lexical 
memory, or central system - a general memory for episodes? For the interpretation of 
patterns of repetition priming, it is perhaps not so much a question of controlling for 
«irrelevant influences)), but of deciding upon the system to which the effect is relevant. 
Thus, from the modularity perspective, the problem becomes to limit central 
processing involvement, while still allowing the input system (the lexicon) to complete 
its processing. How might this be done? The modularity view itself offers a clue, for 
Fodor's (1983) view of the architectural arrangements governing exchanges of informa- 
tion between input systems and mechanism of cognition permits a plausible account of 
cognit ive maskingx of the central processing system. 
The relevant properties, here, concem the way input systems interface with 
central ones. As outlined earlier, input systems are modular and rapid, while the fixation 
of perceptual belief handled by central systems is informationally promiscuous and 
relatively slow. Moreover, belief fixation is sensitive to theutilities of the organism, e.g., 
the attentional demands present in any given situation. The interplay of these properties, 
as it pertains to a possible masking situation, has been neatly summarized by Holender 
(1986): 
What is fascinating in [Fodor's] theoretical formulation is precisely that a 
good (supralirninal) sensory input (1) can undergo a fair amount of processing 
into a modular input system, including lexical access, without necessitating any 
intervention from the central processor and (2) that the central processor can be 
ignorant of the fact that such processing has occurred (p. 60). 
This approach then, suggests that a prime stimulus could affect the state of a 
representation within the lexical input module, but its effectupon subsequent perceptual 
belief might be negligible because of the action of an appropriately timedmask. It should 
also be stressed that in adopting an approach more in terms of the allocation of 
attentional resources, the nature of unconscious capacities are not at issue. 
As it turns out, experiments have shown that this may be achievable in practice 
(e.g., Forster and Davis, 1984). In these experiments, the display characteristics of 
masks and prime are set so that the subject has no explicit memories of the prime event, 
even though a robust repetition priming effect is observed. Thus masking the prime 
apparently provides a straightforward way to restrict the possibility of truly high level 
memories. 
In order to be confident that the technique of masked pnming overcomes the 
interpretation problem, it is necessary to show that it is sensitive solely to aspects of the 
input system. Yet if these aspects could be specifiedin advance, research would be made 
unnecessary; in practice we are limited to an indirect approach, showing that masked 
priming is not influenced by either pre- or post-input system properties. 
One possibility is that masking the priming stimulus has created unusual 
conditions in early perceptual or even «neural» territory, that is, in the process of sensory 
transduction. For this to occur, the neural signals of prime and target would need to 
interact; or if it were sited at the level of preliminary perceptual analysis, the processes 
identifying features of the stimulus shape might be conflated across successive inputs. 
But this does not seem to be the case, for an experiment (Davis and Forster, 1991) which 
used prime-target pairs specifically designed to be either legible or illegible when fused 
together show no differential effects. Further, other experiments (Davis, 1990) have 
shown that the amount of priming drops off very sharply as the prime differs from the 
target. This suggests that stimulus registration of the prime is very good, and once again 
implies that the prime and target are not visually degraded. 
At the other extreme, higher level decision processes (central systems) have 
also to be ruled out, as experiments (Davis, 1990) suggest that information from the 
prime does not affect the decision processes which are mediated in part by central 
inferential systems. So for instance, there was no indication that the lexical status of the 
prime mfluenced the judgment of the lexical status of the target, or that judgments 
conceming the identity of a pre-specified target were influenced by the nature of the prime. 
From these results a picture of masked priming can be fashioned: When the 
prime is presented, it accesses (and opens) its appropriate entry in the mental lexicon, 
which then remains open for a short penod of time. However, because of the action of 
the masks, the fact that the priming word occurred does not become aperceptual belief 
and so does not become an item considered by decision systems. When the target arrives, 
it accesses its appropriate entry, and if this is the same one as the prime has opened, then 
a benefit will accrue. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to go into detail about the various research 
findings made using the masked priming technique, suffice to say that not only is the 
pattern of data obtained different from that obtained with the standard long-term 
unmasked version, (see Forster and Davis, 1984; Forster et al., 1987; Davis, Sánchez- 
Casas and García-Albea, 1991), but masked prirning also appears to provide a new 
method of examining issues connected with the modularity debate. For instance, 
recently Forster and Davis (1991) have shown that the lexical decision and naming task 
(where the subject must pronounce the target string) seem to be differentially sensitive 
to an aspect of the masked stimulus. That is, unlike lexical decision, the naming response 
can be affected by the initial letter of the masked stimulus. One way of describing thic 
difference in task sensitivity is in terms of the availability of information. It is argued that 
pronouncing a word may be a process sensitive to with in language module properties, 
whereas the lexical decision task (which involves central system decisions) is not. 
In conclusion, the modularity thesis, with its notion of specialized processors 
feeding into more general ones, has provided a basis for questioning the interpretation 
of previous results based on repetition priming, and has also furnished the rationale for 
a new investigative technique. 
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